

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND
PRIVACY ACTS**

**SUBJECT: CUSTODIAL DETENTION
SECURITY INDEX**
FILE NUMBER: 100-358086
SECTION: 33



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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1872

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 4, 1955

FROM

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AT KEY FACILITIES

Bufile

Confidential - *Background*

Background

By letter 2/24/55, Los Angeles advised of a form letter proposed by the Hughes Aircraft Company, Culver City, California, to be directed to Bureau offices concerning present or possible Hughes employees. Los Angeles advised that both were the originating officials at Hughes and asked Bureau opinion. You noted "Be certain our L.A. Office is fully aware of his background. He has reportedly been involved in a number of incidents detrimental to Bureau interests since his resignation 6/17/35. No such reports have been received of him. The form letter proposed is undesirable on its own merits since the purpose it would serve is, under the Delimitations Agreement, the primary responsibility of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), United States Air Force, which has security responsibility at Hughes. The form proposed by Hughes appears to be motivated by an effort to circumvent the OSI and allow Hughes to refer matters directly to the FBI in the nature of a "fishing expedition" which would leave us open at some later date to a comment by Hughes that they "had referred the matter to the FBI." In actual practice the form proposed amounts to a name check and would force the offices receiving it to go to time consuming administrative procedures.

-111-

ACTION:

A letter to Los Angeles is attached. It furnishes information regarding and advises the Special Agent in Charge that he should tell Hughes representatives (1) that the form letter cannot be accepted by the FBI and (2) that the best interest of all concerned will best be served through continued coordination with OSI which has security responsibility at Hughes Aircraft Company.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE: March 7, 1955

FROM 8

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - G-11

Re Executives Conference memorandum dated March 3, 1955, posing additional factors to be considered in connection with individuals to be placed or retained on the Security Index. A memorandum is being prepared to the Attorney General, and under date of March 8, 1955, raising this question. It will probably be a week or more before the Attorney General affords us a reply.

Meanwhile the field is engaged in the review of the Security Index cases and inasmuch as the proposed additional factors will materially affect the recommendations by the field, it is suggested that the field's review be held up pending advice from the Attorney General on these additional factors. If we permit the field review to continue, it will be necessary for the field to re-evaluate many of the cases, thus causing real duplication.

I have discussed this with [redacted] who agrees that we should consider temporarily discontinuing the review in the field until we receive a reply from the Attorney General. If the Director agrees, it is recommended that the attached teletype be sent to all SACs.

Attachment sheet 3-8-55-

1874

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: March 4, 1955

FROM : SAC, Pittsburgh

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION PROGRAM

On August 28, 1952, the following suggestion dated August 27, 1952,
made by [redacted], was forwarded to the Bureau by this office.

"SUGGESTION RE SECURITY INDEX

"The following suggestion is being submitted for consideration under the Suggestion Program.

"SAC Letter No. 2, Series 1951, dated January 4, 1951, Section E, outlines the present procedure of typing a complete description and affixing a photograph, where available, on the back of the Security Index card to be filed in the Geographical Section.

No. 1

"The suggestion is being made that the descriptive form as taken from FD-186 (which form is used in compiling the descriptive data to be typed on the Security Index card) be printed on a 5x8 card by the Bureau, leaving a space for the stapling or taping of subject's photograph. This card, after being filled out, will be stapled to the back of the Security Index card to be filed in the Geographical Section. Thereafter when changes are made on the front of the Security Index card and a new Security Index card is received from the Bureau, the card containing the description and the photograph would merely be restapled to the new Security Index card, completely eliminating the process of retyping the description on the new card and minimizing the possibility of errors in the description and also preserving the photograph, which becomes mutilated from constant restapling or retaping to a new card. It will be noted that the Pittsburgh Office alone has 385 Security Index subjects and receives approximately 10-15 new and corrected Security Index cards a week on which, under the present procedure, the complete description must be typed and photograph stapled and it is believed that the above-suggested procedure would save considerable clerical time. The above will also insure uniformity in all offices and uniformity in description in the transfer of Security Index cards to new offices of origin.

No. 2

"It is also suggested as an alternative, that the proper headings as taken from Form FD-186 be printed on the reverse side of the Security Index card by the Bureau. When the Security Index cards are then received in the Field Office it would only be necessary to fill in the descriptive data, thereby resulting in a saving of about half of the time required to type the headings and the description on the card.

1874
Letter to Director

"If neither of the above suggestions is approved the Bureau is requested to authorize the Pittsburgh Office to prepare its own form in line with the suggestion above, i.e., stencil the descriptive headings from FD-186 on to the back of a 5x8 card which will be stapled to the back of the Security Index card."

Bureau letter dated September 5, 1952, to , in reply to the above suggestion set forth that these matters would be carefully considered and in the event the ideas were adopted she would be notified promptly.

SAC Letter #54-63 dated November 9, 1954 (P) SECURITY INDEX -- adopted the No. 2 suggestion from letter of August 27, 1952, and SAC Letter #55-19 dated March 1, 1955, (O) SECURITY INDEX -- adopted the No. 1 suggestion from the same letter.

has never received any acknowledgement of the adoption of either of her suggestions and she feels that if they were, or were not, adopted as a result of her suggestion, that she should have been advised by the Bureau.

In order to complete the file of Bureau advice is requested.

UNRECORDED
Office Manager, 1113 • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE: March 9, 1955

FROM

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES
OF INFORMATION - REVEALING
IDENTITIES OF

Security Index - General

SAC Letter 55-7, Section N, dated February 1, 1955, instructed the field that "The identities of persons which can be revealed must be revealed..." In the attached memorandum from [redacted] to [redacted] dated February 25, 1955, referred to the recommendation that the field be instructed to include a statement on the administrative page of Security of Government Employees and applicant-type reports to the effect that careful consideration had been given to each concealed source, and T symbols were utilized in the report only where essential. [redacted] pointed out that the requirement for such a certification in each report will keep the matter of revealing all possible sources in our reports continuously in the mind of the reporting Agent. [redacted] recommended that an SAC Letter be sent to the field requiring this certification not only in Security of Government Employees and applicant-type reports, but in all types of reports wherein security informants and sources of information have been concealed, as the certification feature is as desirable in all types of cases as in Security of Government Employees and applicant-type cases.

noted that such an SAC Letter should be sent. The Director approved this action.

Attached is a proposed SAC Letter instructing that the above policy requiring the certification on the administrative page of reports be immediately placed into effect in the following type cases:

Security of Government Employees

Loyalty of Employees of the United Nations and Other Public International Organizations

Applicant (excluding Bureau applicants) and Related Investigations

Security and Espionage-Type Investigations

Attachment 3-11-55

The attached proposed SAC Letter emphasizes that Agents must strive to obtain the permission of persons who supply derogatory data, other than the Bureau's regular informants and sources, to allow their names to be openly set forth in our reports, and that the interviews should be conducted in such a manner so that these persons will understand that the protection of the interests of the Government as well as an individual's job may depend on their information.

It is recognized that in some instances a field office will utilize in its report information received in the past by other field offices from informants or sources of those offices; therefore, unless its files contain sufficient information to make a decision regarding the concealment of any informant or source involved, it will be necessary for the office including this information in its current report to make a check with the other offices concerned in order to determine the necessity of currently concealing the identity of the informant or source which was previously concealed. Such action would have to be taken by the reporting office prior to its including the required certification on the administrative page of its current report.

ACTION:

The attached proposed SAC Letter has been approved by the Investigative Division, the Domestic Intelligence Division, and the Training and Inspection Division. Necessary Manual and Handbook changes will be prepared.

OK

OK

• 2 -

2

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Messrs. ~~Robert F. Kennedy, John F. Dulles, George C. Marshall, and~~

DATE: March 15, 1955

FROM : ~~Herbert D. Kappler, Jr.~~SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN EVENT
OF FORMOSAN OPEN HOSTILITIES*On March 15, 1955, the following memorandum was dictated by Herbert D. Kappler, Jr. to the Messrs. Robert F. Kennedy, John F. Dulles, George C. Marshall, and others.*

In preparing for a third departmental conference on the above subject (date to be set later) I have set forth below the status of the departmental program, as reported at our first meeting on February 7, 1955 and at our second meeting on March 14, 1955. If you find any inaccuracies or omissions please advise me.

1. Status of Portfolio.

All three sections of the portfolio are nearing completion under the direction of Mr. Ford of the Office of Legal Counsel. Upon completion and approval by all interested agencies within the Department, the FBI will be given three copies, one to be held at its headquarters here in the Department of Justice, one at Quantico, and one at Little Rock, Arkansas. One copy will be held in the Attorney General's safe in his office, and the remaining copy in the office safe in the Office of Legal Counsel.

UNRECORDED

Office of Security and Civil Control - FBI - PS

REASON:

DATE: March 12, 1947

page 2

POLICE

SUBJECT:

(b) Chinese on Security Index.

Immigration warrants for Chinese non-citizens on security index have been signed by _____ and are in the custody of the FBI, and all instructions to the FBI as to steps to be taken in the event of an emergency have been issued.

is to report on the sufficiency of the legal basis on which these immigration warrants may be used. As to the citizens included in this group, the FBI is intensifying coverage.

(c) Non-Chinese on the Security Index who are sympathetic to Communist China

Those who are included in this group, and are present in the United States, are citizens of the United States. FBI coverage of them is being intensified.

2

9. Office of Legal Counsel is to report on status of instruction letter from Attorney General 1 to the Director of the FBI, dated April 27, 1953 re implementing the apprehension, and search and seizure provisions of the Emergency Detention Program. Meanwhile the Attorney General is holding a proposed revision of these instructions prepared by the Internal Security Division.

JKS

Handle promptly.
d.

UNCLASSIFIED

The Attorney General (orig. & 1)

March 18, 1950

Director, FBI

**JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN EVENT
OF FORMOSAN OPEN HOSTILITIES**

The Attorney General

March 16, 1948

(b) Chinese on Security Index

In your communication of reference, you noted that Immigration warrants signed by ^{Deputy} Attorney General, are in the custody of this Bureau and that all instructions to this Bureau as to steps to be taken in the event of an emergency have been issued.

At our conference on March 14, last, General Special Assistant to the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, furnished you with a memorandum in which the Immigration and Naturalization Service had raised a question as to the legality of the warrants now in the possession of this Bureau covering 36 alien Chinese on the Security Index.

You will recall that I advised you at that time that this Bureau is ready to proceed with this program in accordance with instructions previously received and that if an emergency should occur the next day, this Bureau would go ahead and arrest the 36 aliens based upon the warrants now outstanding. I noted the fact that the question of the type of warrant to be used is one to be resolved by Departmental Attorneys who have had the opportunity in the past to review our information on these aliens. I urge most strongly that any questions existing with respect to the legality of these warrants be resolved at the earliest possible date and that this Bureau be advised in the event it is necessary to change the plans which presently exist.

With regard to the United States citizens of Chinese racial origin who are on the Security Index, I should like to advise you that cases on these individuals are receiving this Bureau's current attention. Since it is not contemplated that these United States citizens will be taken into custody short of an over-all emergency, intensified coverage of these cases will be instituted in the event of Formosan open hostilities.

(d) Non-Chinese on the Security Index
Who Are Sympathetic to Communist China

At our afore-mentioned conference on March 14, last, I advised you that a list of 13 non-Chinese on the Security Index who are sympathetic to Communist China had been compiled. This list is being maintained in a current status and names are being added to or deleted from it as developments and circumstances require. In the event of Formosan open hostilities, I will immediately furnish the then current list to you and will at that time intensify our coverage of these subjects.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
UNRECORDED

TO

DATE: March 16, 1955

FROM

SUBJECT: Justice Department Plans in Event
of Formosan Open Hostilities

I am adding to the agenda for our third departmental conference on the above subject (date to be set later), a discussion of the program for a prehension and retention of persons considered potentially dangerous to the national defense and public safety of the United States. ✓

Mr. Tompkins has advised me that although the Internal Security Act of 1950 provides for the detention by the Attorney General of "each person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in acts of espionage or sabotage", nevertheless this statute is not relied upon as the basis for the above-named program. Rather the legal basis of the program is constitutional power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the program comes into effect only upon such suspension.

The Director of the FBI is proposing new criteria for placing, and retaining, individuals in the security index, which, to a great extent, limit and modify the standards which have previously been made available to the Department. He points out that mass arrests under this program would have a catastrophic effect upon the public and that his recommendation is based, at least in part, in the fact that the Department of Justice is unable for financial reasons to pass upon each case in advance of a national emergency.

A copy of the proposed new criteria has been submitted to Messrs. Rogers and Tompkins and I am sending my copy to Mr. Rankin herewith for his review prior to our departmental meeting.

✓ 1/16/55 J. T. Rankin HCB

TOP SECRET

1875

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 2/15/55

FROM : Executives Conference

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #26-55
MADE BY SA
BUTTE DIVISION

SUGGESTION: *Currently handle on L... data*
It is suggested that descriptive data presently typed on back of Security Index cards by the Field Office be typed instead on a separate card and securely attached to the Security Index card by staples. When a new Security Index card is received for the same subject, and no changes are necessary in the information going on the back of the card, the separate card can be removed from the old Security Index card and attached to the new Security Index card. Present procedure is to retype descriptive data on back of each new Security Index card received.

ADVANTAGES:

The suggester states that the adoption of this suggestion will result in a savings of clerical time.

DISADVANTAGES:

None noted by suggester.

OBSERVATIONS:

SAC Butte, recommends the suggestion be adopted, pointing out that he believes considerable savings on a Bureau-wide basis can be effected.

SAC Baltimore, states that he feels that if this suggestion were adopted it would prove economically beneficial to the Bureau, particularly in the larger offices and in those offices where there are frequent changes in Security Index data. points out that the savings of time which will result will not be realized at the time a Security Index card is changed for the first time but will be realized on subsequent changes of the same card; the stapling of the added data will make for a more bulky Security Index card box and will further effect a little more difficulty in handling the cards.

recommends adoption with the proviso that it not be handled on a project basis but only at such times as changes are made to the Security Index card.

SAC Washington Field Office, feels the suggestion is a good one and recommends that no project be undertaken to prepare 5x8 cards containing this information but that the cards be prepared only at the time the change has been made on one of the Security Index cards.

is
opposed to the suggestion for the following reason: Such a stapling process would be unsatisfactory because it would make the Security Index too bulky; the staples would tear the cards and injuries could result to employees in the stapling process.

SAC New York, advised that he favors adoption of this suggestion as do ASACs and of his office. The New York supervisor who handles the Security Index and the clerical employees who perform the actual work of making changes on the cards all agreed that adoption of this suggestion would effect a saving in time. The New York Office makes about fifty changes per day in its Security Index cards and estimates this suggestion would save one-half the time of a clerical employee. The increased thickness of the cards would, however, require one additional cabinet for storage purposes.

SAC also pointed out that in addition to the time saved in typing the description, the wear and tear on the photograph of the subject occasioned by constantly removing it from the card would be saved as well as the time required. The retyping of the fingerprint classification on many of the cards takes more time than normal typing does, and this would be eliminated if this suggestion is adopted. SAC suggested that the changeover from the present system to the suggested one should be a gradual process; i.e., prepare the separate card when it next becomes necessary to make a change on that particular card. He also desired the Bureau to furnish the field with cards printed with the necessary data now printed on the back of Security Index cards.

The Bureau presently has 26,503 Security Index subjects. The Mechanical Section advises that it would cost a total of \$10.84 to imprint the necessary descriptive headings on 27,500 cards which would be plain on the reverse side. This cost includes the cost of the cards. The same printing job could be produced on bond paper, if such is deemed heavy enough to serve the purpose, for a total cost of \$36.92. The use of bond paper would provide a less bulky Security Index than if two cards are fastened together, but possibly would not be as durable in view of the fact the description is to be stapled to a new card each time one is received. The present cost of Security Index Cards is \$4.63 per thousand. The above quoted cost of 27,500 cards bearing the descriptive headings amounts to \$2.21 per thousand.

PREVIOUS SUGGESTION:

A similar suggestion was made on August 28, 1952, by Memorandum from to dated 9/23/52, states that the views of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the New York and Philadelphic Offices were solicited and all were unanimously opposed to the suggestion.

1875

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION:

The Conference of 2/14/55, composed of Messrs.
recommended unanimously favorable.

If you approve, attached is an SAC Letter and appropriate
manual changes to put this suggestion into effect. Also attached
is a letter to employee Zoeller advising him of the adoption of
his suggestion.

RKM

att. ✓ Q jd

3/29/55

(F) INTERVIEWS OF SUBJECTS OF SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -- Effective immediately, interviews with subjects of security investigations who are not included in the Security Index shall be recommended only where there exists evidence of former membership in a basic revolutionary organization or activity in a subversive group, cited by the Attorney General, in a leadership capacity unless there are specific reasons clearly defined why an interview in a particular case may be desirable.

3/29/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-26

-5-

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

NOT RECORDED
44 MAR 31 1955

66

18/16

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE January 20, 1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX/CARDS
Bufile

SUGGESTION NUMBER 26-55

Attached is suggestion number 26-55 originating with the Butte Office proposing that the descriptive data presently typed on the reverse sides of Security Index cards in the field be typed instead on separate cards to be attached by stapling to the Security Index cards themselves. Under this suggestion, when new Security Index cards are received from the Bureau, the separate cards may be removed from the old Security Index cards for reattachment to the new cards. It is stated that this procedure will eliminate retyping descriptive information when new cards are forwarded to the field as a result of changes in residence or employment.

This particular suggestion has been studied previously by the Bureau, most recently as suggestion number 394-52 which was considered unfavorably as noted in memorandum to [redacted] of September 23, 1952. These principal objections were noted: (1) the additional clerical time consumed in a field division in handling the Security Index cards under the present procedure is nominal even if descriptions have to be retyped each time changed cards are received; (2) the stapling of a card containing a description to the back of each Security Index card in the Geographical Section of the Security Index would double their physical size; (3) after the proposed separate cards are used and handled repeatedly their physical condition would deteriorate, and (4) the possibility also exists that in handling multiple changes in Security Index cards in the field erroneous descriptive data might inadvertently be stapled to the cards of the wrong subject.

It will be noted that memorandum of 9-23-52 reflected the results of inquiry of the Philadelphia and New York Offices. The Philadelphia Office advised that such stapling process was unsatisfactory because it made the Security Index too bulky, the staples would tear the cards, and injuries could result to employees in the stapling process. Comments of the New York Office were identical in substance with those of Philadelphia, according to [redacted] memorandum.

876

In view of the foregoing considerations the
remains definitely opposed
to the suggested procedure.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the
to advise that this Division definitely
opposes adoption of the attached suggestion.

1877
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

128-83

Date March 14, 1955

To: Director, FBI Attention: Training and Inspection Division

From: Special Agent

Field Office or Division New York

SUGGESTION:

The attached form is being recommended as a substitute for the cover letter presently in use in those instances where an SM-C interview has been authorized and the results of interview are being forwarded to the Bureau in report form.

Its advantages are:

- 1) Will streamline processing by Statistical Section & SOG as well as by field supervisors.
- 2) Will reduce dictation and typing time in field.

It should save at least \$ unknown annually.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

ack 3/17/55
cc SAC NY-mem
Copied to Dom. Affs. Div. Rec. &
Dom. Div. & SAC info for
views 3/17/55 - mem
memo to 3/17
Rec not be Adopted.

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(Signature of Suggestor)

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:

While the suggestion does have advantages ~~Mar 1955~~ from a streamlining standpoint, I think the responses to interviews are varied and we should give the responses to interviews exactly as they appear. I therefore believe that we should continue to submit these letters in narrative form and I do not recommend the suggestion be adopted.

(Signature) 
Special Agent in Charge
(Title)

PEERS PLESS

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, F.B.I.

DATE:

FROM : SAC

SUBJECT:

Enclosed are the original and _____ copies of the report of SA _____ dated _____ at _____.

Date of Interview:

Place of Interview: () Residence () Bureau Car () Street
() Other (Specify)

Interviewing Agents:

Cooperative: () Yes () No

Furnished Information re others: () () No

Will Testify re others: () Yes () No

Information furnished in substantial agreement with known data: () Yes () No Reasons:

PSI or CS potential: () Yes () No

Request authority to recontact for PSI or CS purposes: () Yes
() No

FD 122 submitted () Yes dated _____ () No

Remarks:

Encl:

ENCLOSURE

2

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: March 18, 1955

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 11 cards were added to the Security Index and 7 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 4 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,629.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

1879
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 11, 1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX
Bufile

The following is a report on the status of the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on February 11, 1955.

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>
February 12-18	20	6	14
February 19-25	43	13	30
February 26 - March 4	9	70	(- 61)
March 5-11	11	73	(- 62)
	<u>83</u>	<u>162</u>	<u>(- 79)</u>

During the above-mentioned period there was a net decrease in the Security Index of 79 cards.

For your information, during the preceding four-week period 159 cards were added and 52 were cancelled. a net increase of 107 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,625.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

21 MAR 22 1955

ADDENDUM: 3/14/55 - If the revised Security Index criteria are approved by the Department, their application by the field is expected to considerably reduce the Security Index count upon resumption of the review of these cases. We asked the Department's approval of the revised criteria by letter of 3/9/55.

53 MAR 24 1955

1880

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: March 14, 1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: DELINQUENCY IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

SYNOPSIS:

Each month we follow the field closely on the status of security work by analyzing the backlog of pending cases and delinquency in Espionage, Internal Security, Security Matter and foreign intelligence cases in classifications 65, 100 and 105. Status of these cases as of February 28, 1955, is set forth herein.

Pending active matters in the entire field in the security classifications increased somewhat from 22,878 to 23,118. Delinquent matters increased from 6,806 to 7,227 with the resultant over-all statistical increase from 29.7 per cent to 31.2 per cent. The delinquent security cases in the New York Office increased from 1,629 to 2,481, increasing delinquency from 27.7 per cent to 40.5 per cent. The number of pending active matters in the [100] classification increased in the New York Office from 4,373 to 4,613 and the delinquent items in this classification increased from 1,332 to 2,075 or statistical delinquency of 44.9 per cent.

Considerable improvement was shown last month by the Los Angeles and San Francisco Offices. Although only a slight reduction was made in pending active cases, Los Angeles reduced delinquent items from 900 to 610, a statistical decrease from 39 per cent to 26.5 per cent. San Francisco reduced both their total pending active and delinquent case figures from 1,584 to 1,403 and from 784 to only 326. As a result, San Francisco's security delinquency dropped from 49 per cent to only 23 per cent as of February 28, 1955.

Letters are being sent to the large offices indicated by asterisks on page 4 and to the smaller offices indicated by asterisks on page 7 herein, commenting upon their delinquent condition and pointing out the necessity of bringing their security cases to current status.

RECOMMENDATION:

The field will continue to be followed closely regarding security

Bufile

delinquency and you will be advised of the results of the review of the March, 1955, administrative reports.

DETAILS:

Since December, 1951, we have been following, on a monthly basis, the twelve field offices having a large proportion of our pending security work and since March, 1952, all offices. We have written letters to the twelve offices and to other offices where progress in reducing the backlog of work and delinquency has not been satisfactory.

The February, 1955, administrative reports from all offices reflect that the total pending active matters in the classifications 65, 100 and 105 increased somewhat from 22,873 to 23,118. The delinquent items increased from 6,806 to 7,227, which represents a statistical increase of from 29.7 per cent to 31.2 per cent.

The following statistics reflect the status of pending work including both pending active and pending inactive matters and delinquency for all field divisions as of December 31, 1951, and the progress for the last four months:

**TOTAL PENDING MATTERS
CLASSIFICATIONS 65, 100 and 105
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS**

<u>Classification</u>	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>11-30-54</u>	<u>12-31-54</u>	<u>1-31-55</u>	<u>2-28-55</u>
65	1,314	1,035	1,050	1,017	1,000
100	32,812	22,419	22,075	21,790	21,840
105	<u>2,895</u>	<u>3,493</u>	<u>3,565</u>	<u>3,556</u>	<u>3,681</u>
Total	37,021	26,947	26,690	26,363	26,521

TOTAL DELINQUENT MATTERS
CLASSIFICATIONS 65, 100 and 105
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<u>Classification</u>	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>11-30-54</u>	<u>12-31-54</u>	<u>1-31-55</u>	<u>2-28-55</u>
65	525	170	136	137	186
100	22,518	6,018	5,890	5,969	6,210
105	<u>1,719</u>	<u>730</u>	<u>671</u>	<u>700</u>	<u>831</u>
Total	24,762	6,918	6,697	6,806	7,227

The following statistics reflect the total of pending active matters delinquency and percentage of delinquency of all offices since January 31, 1953.

CLASSIFICATIONS 65, 100 and 105
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
1-31-53	24,098	11,772	48.8%
2-28-53	22,935	11,233	46.9%
3-31-53	23,033	10,890	47.3%
4-30-53	22,100	9,120	41.3%
5-31-53	21,740	9,730	44.8%
6-30-53	20,970	9,558	45.6%
7-31-53	20,180	9,411	46.6%
8-31-53	19,493	8,495	43.6%
9-30-53	19,224	7,571	39.4%
10-31-53	19,141	5,580	34.3%
11-30-53	19,833	6,655	33.5%
12-31-53	19,947	6,749	33.2%
1-31-54	20,520	7,494	36.5%
2-28-54	21,488	6,007	27.9%
3-31-54	21,848	6,617	30.2%
4-30-54	21,752	6,757	31.6%
5-31-54	21,863	7,822	35.8%
6-30-54	22,278	7,407	33.2%
7-31-54	22,977	7,163	31.6%
8-31-54	22,361	7,010	31.3%
9-30-54	23,011	6,720	29.1%
10-31-54	22,452	6,413	28.5%
11-30-54	23,179	6,918	29.7%
12-31-54	23,181	6,697	28.8%
1-31-55	22,878	6,806	29.7%
2-28-55	23,118	7,227	31.2%

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Status of Security Work in Twelve of the Larger Offices

The following statistics reflect the progress of the twelve larger offices we have been closely following since December, 1951. These offices have approximately 80 per cent of the total Security Index cards and a high percentage of the pending work and delinquency in classification 65, 100 and 105.

**STATISTICS FOR TWELVE OFFICES
SECURITY INDEX COUNT AND FOR
65, 100 and 105 MATTERS**

<u>Office</u>	<u>Security Index Cards 2-15-55</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters</u>		<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>	
		<u>1-31-55</u>	<u>2-28-55</u>	<u>1-31-55</u>	<u>2-28-55</u>
* New York	7,184	5,890	6,120	27.7%	40.5%
* Los Angeles	4,242	2,301	2,296	39.0%	26.5%
* San Francisco	2,349	1,584	1,403	49.0%	23.0%
* Chicago	1,544	1,487	1,481	49.0%	54.8%
* Detroit	1,353	965	965	43.0%	46.0%
Philadelphia	1,211	915	969	22.0%	25.0%
* Newark	927	1,090	1,078	29.0%	35.5%
* Boston	687	701	658	26.0%	28.0%
Seattle	681	365	373	21.0%	23.0%
* Cleveland	680	536	515	26.0%	32.0%
New Haven	532	517	487	36.0%	25.6%
Minneapolis	531	311	426	18.0%	10.0%
Total	21,921	16,662	16,771		

* Letters being sent to offices indicated. See page 8 herein.

The over-all statistics for the eleven offices other than the New York Office since August 31, 1952, are as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent (65-100-105)</u>
8-31-52	12,611	7,589	60.2%
9-30-52	11,367	5,732	50.4%
10-31-52	11,286	4,957	43.9%
11-30-52	11,148	4,844	43.5%
12-31-52	10,937	4,578	41.9%
1-31-53	10,730	4,696	43.8%
2-28-53	10,721	4,358	40.6%
3-31-53	10,069	4,019	39.9%
4-30-53	9,411	2,887	30.7%
5-31-53	9,277	3,447	37.2%
6-30-53	8,964	3,532	39.4%
7-31-53	8,908	3,758	42.2%
8-31-53	8,547	3,618	42.3%
9-30-53	8,601	3,249	37.8%
10-31-53	8,845	2,785	31.4%
11-30-53	9,434	2,871	30.4%
12-31-53	9,552	3,261	34.1%
1-31-54	9,814	3,318	33.6%
2-28-54	10,288	3,021	29.4%
3-31-54	10,188	2,998	29.4%
4-30-54	10,201	3,209	31.5%
5-31-54	9,840	3,920	39.8%
6-30-54	8,839	3,679	37.5%
7-31-54	10,317	3,348	32.4%
8-31-54	10,048	3,364	33.4%
9-30-54	10,669	3,488	32.7%
10-31-54	10,557	3,376	31.9%
11-30-54	11,063	3,822	34.5%
12-31-54	11,092	3,728	33.6%
1-31-55	10,772	3,976	36.9%
2-28-55	10,651	3,429	32.2%

New York Office

In January, 1954, the New York delinquency stood at 53 per cent. It was reduced, however, in February, 1954, to 32 per cent and during the period March through September, 1954, averaged 38 per cent. In October, 1954, the New York security delinquency dropped to 30.9 per cent, on November 30, 1954, to 29.3 per cent, and on December 31, 1954, to 26.4 per cent, the figure in each successive instance representing the lowest percentage of delinquency in the security classifications which had existed in the New York Office since this matter has been followed on a regular basis by the Bureau. In January, 1955, the New York security delinquency

increased from 26.4 per cent in December, 1954, the lowest figure ever computed for that office, to 27.7 per cent as of January 31, 1955.

The New York administrative report for February, 1955, reveals that security delinquency has increased still further to 40.5 per cent as of February 28, 1955. Pending active matters in classifications 65, 100 and 105 rose from 5,890 to 6,120 while delinquent matters increased substantially from 1,629 to 2,481. It was noted that New York's over-all delinquency also increased during the past month from 22 per cent to 30.1 per cent. We are sending a letter to New York.

The New York Office has approximately 26 per cent of the pending active matters in the 65, 100 and 105 classifications in the entire field. This office also has approximately 34 per cent of the number of delinquent items in these classifications throughout the field. The average delinquency in all other offices at the end of February, 1955, was approximately 23 per cent. The New York delinquency was 40.5 per cent as previously noted.

The bulk of the New York backlog and delinquency is in the 100 classification. During February, 1955, the number of pending active matters in the 100 classification in the New York Office increased from 4,373 to 4,613. The number of delinquent matters in this classification increased from 1,332 to 2,075 with a statistical increase from 30.5 per cent for January, 1955, to 44.9 per cent as of February 28, 1955.

Status of Security Work in the Remaining Forty Offices

The remaining forty offices are listed according to the percentage of delinquency on February 28, 1955, in total matters in classifications 65, 100 and 105. These statistics reflect the progress during February, 1955. It should be noted that many of the smaller offices have no pending matters in classifications 65 and 105 and their entire pending backlog is in classification 100 matters.

<u>Office</u>	<u>Active Matters</u>		<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>	
	<u>1-31-55</u>	<u>2-28-55</u>	<u>1-31-55</u>	<u>2-28-55</u>
* Richmond	95	87	18%	38%
* Charlotte	93	99	22%	34%
* Memphis	45	44	4%	30%
* Atlanta	95	100	8%	29%
* Milwaukee	237	232	23%	28%
* Houston	69	84	20%	27%
* Pittsburgh	353	323	19%	27%
* Cincinnati	322	308	33%	26%
* Miami	207	212	28%	26%
Birmingham	34	32	15%	25%
Indianapolis	178	160	20%	25%
Buffalo	490	372	17%	23%
Baltimore	490	492	32%	22%
Washington Field	949	1,034	19%	22%
Albany	280	260	22%	20%
Anchorage	36	36	6%	20%
Mobile	65	51	22%	20%
Phoenix	98	105	20%	20%
San Juan	141	156	22%	20%
Albuquerque	65	60	12%	18%
Oklahoma City	48	61	19%	18%
San Diego	256	323	16%	18%
Salt Lake City	74	76	18%	17%
Knoxville	33	31	12%	16%
New Orleans	136	198	13%	16%
San Antonio	57	55	9%	16%
Denver	172	170	9%	15%
El Paso	42	40	16%	15%
Kansas City	107	102	20%	15%
Norfolk	69	61	14%	15%
Savannah	34	39	6%	15%
Springfield	126	145	17%	14%
Butte	75	87	8%	13%
Louisville	47	60	15%	12%
Portland	146	133	8%	12%
St. Louis	268	285	13%	12%
Dallas	77	109	9%	11%
Little Rock	20	19	40%	10%
Omaha	56	67	20%	10%
Honolulu	31	39	0%	8%

* Letters sent to offices indicated regarding delinquent status.
See page 8 herein.

The following figures illustrate the progress of the forty offices as a whole since December 31, 1952, as reflected in the administrative reports:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
12-31-52	6,228	1,691	27.2%
1-31-53	6,080	1,554	25.6%
2-28-53	6,103	1,515	24.6%
3-31-53	5,936	1,542	26.0%
4-30-53	5,864	1,414	24.1%
5-31-53	4,897	1,726	29.3%
6-30-53	5,611	1,577	28.1%
7-31-53	5,146	1,358	26.4%
8-31-53	5,095	1,323	26.0%
9-30-53	5,050	1,219	24.1%
10-31-53	4,987	1,087	21.8%
11-30-53	5,180	1,355	26.1%
12-31-53	5,280	1,301	24.6%
1-31-54	5,562	1,444	25.9%
2-28-54	5,997	1,347	22.5%
3-31-54	6,079	1,431	23.5%
4-30-54	6,174	1,327	21.5%
5-31-54	6,733	1,710	25.4%
6-30-54	7,022	1,522	21.6%
7-31-54	6,910	1,590	23.0%
8-31-54	6,728	1,520	22.5%
9-30-54	6,710	1,410	21.0%
10-31-54	6,594	1,398	21.2%
11-30-54	6,767	1,519	22.4%
12-31-54	6,449	1,477	22.4%
1-31-55	6,216	1,201	19.3%
2-28-55	6,347	1,317	20.7%

Letters to the Field

Letters are being sent to the large offices indicated by asterisks on page 4 and to the smaller offices indicated by asterisks on page 7 herein. A total of 17 letters are being sent to the field in this matter, commenting upon existing delinquency and pointing out the necessity of bringing security cases to and maintaining them at proper levels.

*JM W 4/29/54
GHS*

Assistant Attorney General

March 21, 1955

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX LIST

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of the individuals maintained in the Security Index. Names included in the main portion of the list are arranged alphabetically. The names of individuals coming within five designated groups are listed on separate pages. Following each name is information reflecting the race, sex, birth date, Bureau file number and the Bureau field office covering the residence of the individual.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

Attachment

NOTE ON YELLOW ONLY:

Espionage Section of the Special Section not included. The five designated groups are:

Foreign Government Employees
United Nations Employees
Pro-Tito Yugoslavs
U. S. Government Employees
Atomic Energy Program Employees

3/15/55

SAC LETTER #55-22
3-15-55

Section I - Part 7

Security Index - GENERAL

(I) SECURITY INFORMANTS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION - REVEALING IDENTITIES OF -- The instructions stated in SAC Letter 55-7, Section N, regarding "Security Informants and Sources - Revealing Identities of" are to be closely followed. I want to emphasize the fact that the use of T symbols must be held to an absolute minimum in our reports. Agents conducting interviews with persons who supply derogatory data, other than regular Bureau informants and sources, must strive to obtain such persons' permission to have their names set forth openly in our reports. The interviews must be conducted in such a manner so that the persons will understand that the protection of the interests of the Government as well as an individual's job may depend on their information and, therefore, it is highly desirable that they allow their names to be openly used in connection with the information they furnish.

The procedures set forth below are effective immediately in the following type cases:

Security of Government Employees

Loyalty of Employees of the United Nations and Other Public International Organizations

Applicant (excluding Bureau applicants) and Related Investigations

Security and Espionage-Type Investigations.

Any report which contains T symbols concealing the identities of any sources of information set forth in the report must contain a statement on the administrative page to the effect that careful consideration has been given to each source concealed and T symbols were utilized in the report only in those instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed.

In any case where your report contains information attributed to T symbols, which information was originally furnished other offices by informants or sources of such offices, you must check with these offices to insure the identities of these informants or sources cannot be openly stated in your current report unless your files contain sufficient information to make a decision regarding the concealment of such informants or sources.

3/15/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-22

—6—

3/15/55

It will, of course, still be necessary to include identifying data of informants and sources concealed on the administrative page of the report and, where applicable, reasons for concealment, such as neighbors and professional individuals who specifically request their identities be concealed.

This must be given your personal attention so that these instructions are immediately brought to the attention of all appropriate personnel of your office.

1-2

2

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE: March 2, 1955

FROM

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX REVIEW
Bufile

By SAC Letter 55-8 of February 2, 1955, a review of all Security Index cases was initiated. The field was instructed to submit airtel reports each Friday of the progress until the review is completed. Offices with less than 1,000 Security Index subjects were instructed to complete the project in sixty days. The remaining offices were instructed to complete the review in ninety days with the exception of New York which is to complete this project within six months

There were 26,718 subjects included in the Security Index as of February 18, 1955.

The airtels of February 25, 1955, from the field reflect that 2,623 cases have been reviewed as of that date, approximately 10 per cent, and the required data forwarded to the Bureau.

As of March 1, 1955, 607 cases have been analyzed and processed in the Internal Security Section. Of this number, 25 cancellations have been recommended by the SAC's. The recommendations for cancellations by the SAC's were approved by the Bureau without exception.

ACTION:

You will be kept advised of the progress of the reviews on a weekly basis.

1857

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 3/25/55

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 16 cards were added to the Security Index and 90 cards were cancelled, a net decrease of 74 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,555.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 3/21/55

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS

There are 26,622 persons represented in the Security Index (as of March 15, 1955). This is a net decrease of 80 or 3/10ths of 1 percent under last month. Of the total, 24,767 or 93.0 percent are communists.

The race of Chinese in the index are now shown separately in the race breakdown on the attached table.

A detailed table is attached in duplicate. The table shows as of March 15, 1955, the distribution of the subjects by field office, nationalistic tendencies, dangerousness, sex, race, and citizenship. Also the number on "special lists" are shown. A key to abbreviations is attached.

and additional columns that are included in Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7. These are the *Final Sections*.

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18

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS USED IN SECURITY INDEX

AL Alien
CS Comsab
DC Detcom
KF Key Figure

NA Naturalized
NB Native Born
TF Top Functionary
UN Unknown

AEP Atomic Energy Program Employees
BUL Bulgarian
COM Communist Party, USA
ESP Espionage Subjects

FGE Foreign Government Employees
GOV United States Government Employees
HUN Hungarian
ISL Independent Socialist League

JFG Johnson Forest Group
MCI Muslim Cult of Islam
MIS Miscellaneous
NPR Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico

PPA Proletarian Party of America
RUS Russian
SUA Socialist Union of America
SWP Socialist Workers' Party

UNE United Nations Employees
UPR Union of the People for the Establishment
of the Republic of Puerto Rico
YUG Yugoslavian

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: March 18, 1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY REPORTS - DOCUMENTATION
Bufile

Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions on pages 44b and 45 provides for the documentation of material appearing in reports. Such documentation is set out on administrative pages and consists of identifying the source, showing the date of the activity reported, the date the information was received, the identity of the Agents receiving the information and location of the original exhibit in field office files. Under this procedure the field can readily locate the original exhibits pertaining to each of our security subjects, its desirability based to a great extent upon the possible use of these reports in connection with the Emergency Detention Program.

There are instances in which a report is prepared by one office utilizing data which originated with a previous office of origin. In these circumstances the Manual instructs the office preparing the report to send a separate letter to the other office requesting the documentary information. The report is not held up, however, but is forwarded on to the Bureau. Upon receipt of the documentary information the office preparing the report forwards new administrative pages to the Bureau setting out the documentary information originating with the previous office of origin.

It is to be noted that these supplemental documentation pages contain new material and contain no corrective material.

SAC Letter 55-23 (B) of 3/16/55, provided for submission of amended pages in certain instances wherein necessary amendments were not susceptible to other corrective action - e.g., by erasures, inked or typed notations.

Our documentation pages are to be distinguished from the situations discussed in the above SAC Letter: (1) They contain no corrective data and (2) their sole purpose is to incorporate additive documentary material into the administrative sections of our reports.

OBSERVATIONS:

We have given this situation careful study and we feel that

the procedure of submitting supplementary documentation pages in security reports, described above, should be continued for the following reasons: (1) Our reports must continue to be properly documented as to the original sources and the location of the exhibits in the office files; (2) There should be no delay in submitting reports pending receipt of documentary information from a previous office of origin or from any other office in which portions of the information originated and (3) the new documentary material coming from a previous office of origin is more readily handled by use of supplemental pages than by notations. In some instances the documentary data are extensive and both Agent and clerical time can be saved by avoiding the necessity of entering the material by longhand on the old administrative pages of the basic report. Further, the Bureau can always be certain that the data in field reports are accurate, impossible when each office involved makes its own modifications individually. It appears desirable, however, to instruct the field to "flag" these supplemental pages to assist in their handling at the Bureau. We propose to have them submitted hereafter by cover letter, pointing out specificall therein that the pages have been prepared solely to incorporate the additional documentary material.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the attached SAC Letter will be transmitted to the field in line with the above observations. Appropriate Manual changes are attached.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: March 21, 1955

TO :
4K
FROM :SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX
BUFILE

There is attached a letter to Albany and all other offices dated March 25, 1955, which we transmit to the field quarterly to reconcile the Security Index in each office with the Index at the Seat of Government.

The original of the attached letter is on plastiplate and the letter may be obtained for initialing by calling

✓

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: March 22, 1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

By memorandum dated March 9, 1955, we proposed to the Attorney General that the criteria for placing or retaining individuals on the Security Index be changed. We requested advice at the earliest opportunity if the changes met with the Attorney General's approval.

By memorandum dated March 16, 1955, to _____ and the Director, the Attorney General stated he was adding this question to the agenda of the next Departmental conference dealing with Justice Department plans in event of Formosa open hostilities. In this memorandum the Attorney General states that _____ has told him that although the Internal Security Act of 1950 has detention provisions, the emergency detention program is based on the constitutional power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus rather than the Internal Security Act of 1950.

Frankly, I feel that any effort to discuss this extremely important subject at the Attorney General's conference is out of place and will merely result in delaying tactics on a matter which should be resolved at once.

Following the Attorney General's conference on March 14, I spoke to _____ and suggested that the Internal Security Division act promptly on our letter carrying the proposed changes. _____ called me back on the evening of March 18 to state informally that the Internal Security Division had looked over our proposals and agreed with them although they had not discussed them as yet with _____ and, of course, _____ division would not be replying to our proposals in view of the Attorney General's instructions that the matter be taken up at the next conference.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you desire, we can reply to the Attorney General's memorandum of March 16 by suggesting that this matter should be resolved very promptly and that it may be desirable for the Internal Security Division and Rankin's office, if necessary, to make an immediate study

of our proposals so that the Attorney General may come to an immediate decision on this matter. If you prefer that this be done telephonically, it would probably have to be done at least on the level of and either or I can do this.

I do think that this should be settled at one as we are holding up our field review of Security Index subjects pending the Department's decision.

gpmv Q
zba

I suggest Belmont — ^{WES}
see Sompkins and —
nichols talk to
Rogers along this
line 3123 4.0

March 21, 1955

1891

MEMORANDUM FOR MESSAGE.

0
Inspections GENERAL

Re: INSPECTION INSTRUCTIONS

3/11/50 1891

8. I have not been satisfied with the handling of the Security Index and the Inspection Staff is at fault for not detecting the weaknesses and bringing them to my attention. It is obvious that a good many people currently carried as Security Index subjects could not be held during an emergency period; sufficient facts do not exist to warrant detention. Your Inspectors have not been sufficiently vigorous in your analyses of the cases developed. I want you to make certain that all dangerous people are listed on the Security Index; those not possessed of dangerousness (so-called riffraff) should be promptly removed from the Index with Bureau concurrence.

UNCLASSIFIED

MARCH 3 1955

TO : THE BIRMINGHAM

DEPT OF JUSTICE, BIRMINGHAM

FROM : THE EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

On March 1, 1955, the Executives' Conference consisting of ~~Massachusetts~~ and ~~for~~ considered additional proposed guides to assist the field in its current review of Security Index cases and also concerning individuals to be placed on the Index in the future.

In connection with the current review of Security Index cases in the field and in connection with the placing of persons on the Security Index in the future, from discussions with field representatives there is an apparent need to give the field guidance in order that those persons retained on or placed on the Security Index will be restricted to individuals against whom a clear case of potential dangerousness in the event of emergency can be proved. To assist the field in this respect, the Domestic Intelligence Division proposed that an SAC Letter be sent to the field instructing that in evaluating these cases, in addition to the criteria presently listed in the Manual of Instructions, two additional factors must be considered, as follows:

(1) The investigation must show:

- (a) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants or individuals;
- (b) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organization within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals;

3/3/5

SECURITY INDEX EVALUATION

(c) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals;

(d) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the security of the country in time of emergency.

(2) In evaluating interviews with Security Index subjects or potential Security Index subjects, the following shall be adhered to:

(a) Whenever a subject of a security investigation by a positive statement to interviewing agents clearly indicates a continued adherence to the doctrines, aims or purposes of a revolutionary organization or a front organization, the positive statement shall be considered an overt act on the part of the subject in establishing continued adherence.

(b) Other than as indicated above, interviews with Security Index subjects or potential Security Index subjects are not to be considered as factors requiring the placing or retaining names of persons on the Security Index; for example, lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not to be regarded as such factors.

Executives' Conference Recommendation:

The Executives' Conference unanimously recommended that this proposed SAC Letter be sent out to the field in order that the field may be given appropriate guidance.



ENCLOSURE

3/2/55

John T. Quinn, Jr. - FBI - Boston

While concurring with the need for the attached SAC Letter to afford the field guidance in carrying out present Bureau policy, [redacted] stated that he disagrees with the concept now being applied to the Security Index. This concept requires that the case against a Security Index subject be of such a nature that the evidence against the subject will clearly require a hearing board to hold the subject in detention subsequent to his arrest.

[redacted] feels that the FBI has an overriding and fundamental security responsibility to place on the Index for apprehension all individuals who in the experience of the Bureau should be considered potentially dangerous in an emergency despite the fact that the investigation has been unable to develop witnesses or evidence which could conclusively require a hearing board to hold the subject. Due to the security precautions of the Communist Party and the known "sleeper" and "colonization" programs of the Party, the two-faced, deceitful tactics inherent in the Communist Movement, and the consequent lack of concrete proof which can be developed through investigation, it is many times impossible to develop evidence to the extent required under the above concept.

[redacted] feels most emphatically that it should not be given be the job of the Bureau to decide who should be arrested; that this is a job for the Department. However, the Department to the FBI has refused to do its job and the burden rests with the FBI.

[redacted] realizes that if the hearing boards release a considerable number of persons arrested, the Bureau will be open to criticism; however, the Security Index was devised for the purposes of protecting the country in time of most grave emergency and under the conditions of devastation, confusion and chaos which will occur should this country be attacked by Soviet Russia, it is [redacted] opinion that the FBI must carry out its security responsibilities to the country to the utmost. In addition, under the conditions which will exist in an all-out emergency, the attitude of the country and the hearing boards will be markedly different from the attitude now existing.

[redacted] realizes that this matter has been given most careful consideration by the Bureau; however, inasmuch as his dissent is deep-seated, he is expressing it, as set forth above.

We must face up to reality. Whether we like it or not the Dept. has "passed" the buck. They can't arrest. It is wrong to prosecute but you are the "goal". Do you want justice or revenge?

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

3/3/55

If you agree, the attached SAC Letter will be disseminated to the field immediately.

Respectfully,
For the Conference

3/2: Received SAC letter not sent to...
...in time in PR 1002, information and in
information for the Conference to be...
...in time in PR 1002, information and in
information for the Conference to be...

I think the factors
considered by the
Conference are
thoroughly sound.

I recommend we
present the proposed
policy to the AS,
Rogers and Tompkins
for a definite ruling
for our future guidance

3/5

we should also point out
the proposed two (2)
categories of the index
1. upon declaration of war
2. Should invasion occur

- 4 -

It should be pointed out of Do not do
the same for the Conference to be...
...in time in PR 1002, information and in
information for the Conference to be...

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO : THE DIRECTOR
FROM :
SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN THE EVENT OF FORMOSAN
OPEN HOSTILITIES

DATE: March 14, 1955

✓

3/17/57

(b) Chinese on Security Index

The Director outlined the procedure we will follow relative to the thirty-six aliens on the Security Index, pointing out that Deputy Attorney General had signed deportation warrants regarding all thirty-six and that these warrants are now in our field offices ready for service. He pointed out that the Department is studying further whether there is a legal question as to the effectiveness of these warrants in those instances where INS already had deportation warrants concerning six of the subjects.

General [unclear] raised the question as to whether the evidence against these aliens is sufficient to hold them before the court except in those cases where deportation had already been authorized under INS procedures. After discussion,

UNCLASSIFIED

3/14/55

the Attorney General instructed that check the procedure as to the legality of the warrants signed by Deputy Attorney and that check the individual cases as to whether the subjects could be held under the deportation warrants.

General furnished the Attorney General an INS memorandum dated February 14, 1955, regarding INS views. The Director pointed out that we had not been furnished with a copy of this memorandum.

The Director further pointed out to the Attorney General that we are ready to proceed and that if an emergency should occur tomorrow, we would go ahead and arrest these thirty-six aliens based on the warrants in our possession, further that the question of the type of warrant used is for the Department to decide as the Departmental Attorneys had gone over the cases and had drawn up the warrants. (If you agree, we will have Liaison get a copy of the INS memorandum of 2/14/55, mentioned above. It is noted also that some of these thirty-six aliens may be taken off the Security Index if the Department approves the change in our standards now pending at the Department.)

5/17/45

(d) Non-Chinese on The Security Index Who
Are Sympathetic to Communist China

The Director stated that this list is now composed of thirteen individuals and in the event of an emergency we would immediately furnish the names to the Department. As these thirteen are all United States citizens, in an emergency we would intensify our coverage of them but would not, of course, make arrests. [redacted] raised the question as to the danger of Russian officials who would, of course, be sympathetic to the Chinese in the event of a Formosan emergency. The Director pointed out that the only action we could take there would be in intensifying our coverage of them which we would do.

10/12/62

3/17/62

2. We will review the cases of the thirty-six Chinese aliens on the basis of the revised standards so that they who do not meet the standards will be removed if the Attorney General approves the revised standards.

OK

2

C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : *W.*DATE: March 21,
1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX LIST

The Security Index list as of 3/15/55, has been prepared. One copy is attached herewith for transmittal to the SAC, Quantico, for retention in his personal custody with the other vital records maintained at the FBI Academy.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That this memorandum and attached list be forwarded to the SAC, Quantico, marked Personal and Confidential, Registered, Return Receipt Requested. - *R. A. F. at Quantico*

3-23-55 - F. B. I.

2. That upon receipt, the SAC, Quantico, place the attached list with the other vital records maintained at Quantico, personally destroy by burning the old Security Index list in his possession and note hereon that such action has been taken.

*done 3/24/55**1d 88 -*

3. That thereafter, this memorandum be returned to the Bureau, marked for my attention.



1893

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : *✓*

DATE: March 24, 1955

FROM : *✓*

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

called from the Department on the afternoon of March 24, 1955. He referred to a conversation he had with you regarding these standards. He said that *✓* there is supposed to be a meeting in the Department regarding the standards but that no date has been set. He further said that before he left down on the evening of March 24, 1955, instructed that a letter be sent to the Bureau regarding the standards. wanted/knew that a letter is coming over on the morning of March 25.

said this letter will not be in the nature of an agreement on the part of the Department but will be rather an inquiry as to our understanding certain of the standards. He wanted you to know about this.

ACTION:

For your information.

SAC, Albany

March 25, 1955

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SECURITY INDEX

There is attached hereto for each office an alphabetical list of its Security Index subjects prepared from the Bureau's Security Index as of March 15, 1955. Each subject is identified by name, race, sex and date of birth. The subjects carried in the various subdivisions of the Special Section are listed on separate lines under the appropriate headings. It is requested that this list be used to reconcile the Security Index in your office with the Index at the Seat of Government by checking the names on the list against your Security Index cards.

Attachment

2 cc - Albuquerque (1/Attach)
2 cc - Anchorage (1/Attach)
2 cc - Atlanta (1/Attach)
2 cc - Baltimore (1/Attach)
2 cc - Birmingham (1/Attach)
2 cc - Boston (1/Attach)
2 cc - Buffalo (1/Attach)
2 cc - Butte (1/Attach)
2 cc - Charlotte (1/Attach)
2 cc - Chicago (1/Attach)
2 cc - Cincinnati (1/Attach)
2 cc - Cleveland (1/Attach)
2 cc - Dallas (1/Attach)
2 cc - Denver (1/Attach)
2 cc - Detroit (1/Attach)
2 cc - El Paso (1/Attach)
2 cc - Honolulu (1/Attach)
2 cc - Houston (1/Attach)
2 cc - Indianapolis (1/Attach)
2 cc - Kansas City (1/Attach)
2 cc - Knoxville (1/Attach)
2 cc - Little Rock (1/Attach)
2 cc - Los Angeles (1/Attach)
2 cc - Louisville (1/Attach)
2 cc - Memphis (1/Attach)
2 cc - Miami (1/Attach)

2 cc - Milwaukee (1/Attach)
2 cc - Minneapolis (1/Attach)
2 cc - Mobile (1/Attach)
2 cc - Newark (1/Attach)
2 cc - New Haven (1/Attach)
2 cc - New Orleans (1/Attach)
2 cc - New York (1/Attach)
2 cc - Norfolk (1/Attach)
2 cc - Oklahoma City (1/Attach)
2 cc - Omaha (1/Attach)
2 cc - Philadelphia (1/Attach)
2 cc - Phoenix (1/Attach)
2 cc - Pittsburgh (1/Attach)
2 cc - Portland (1/Attach)
2 cc - Richmond (1/Attach)
2 cc - St. Louis (1/Attach)
2 cc - Salt Lake City (1/Attach)
2 cc - San Antonio (1/Attach)
2 cc - San Diego (1/Attach)
2 cc - San Francisco (1/Attach)
2 cc - San Juan (1/Attach)
2 cc - Savannah (1/Attach)
2 cc - Seattle (1/Attach)
2 cc - Springfield (1/Attach)
2 cc - Washington, D.C. (1/Attach)

MAILED 2
MAILER 2
MARCH 25 1955

ORIGINAL ON DUPLIMAT

REF ID: A65666

RECORDED 3/21/55, WGO:gmf.

WGO:gmf

REC'D
3/25/55
FBI - BOSTON
WGO:gmf

NPL

In checking this list against your Security Index the following items should be considered and handled as follows:

1. If the name of a subject on the attached list is not included in your Security Index, you should check that subject's case file to determine his correct Security Index status. An appropriate notation should be placed adjacent to the subject's name on the enclosed list reflecting the correct Security Index status for the subject. If his name should be deleted from the Bureau's Security Index the notation should refer to the previous communication from your office which recommended cancellation. If you do not have a Security Index card for the subject and a card should be in your Index, the notation should request the Bureau to forward cards to your office.
2. If this check discloses the names of subjects in your Security Index which do not appear on the attached list, the names of such subjects and the Bureau file number (where known) should be set forth on a separate sheet of paper with the date that the subject was recommended for inclusion in the Security Index. Instances of this nature will occur in those cases where subjects have recently been recommended for inclusion in the Index and were not included therein at the time of printing of the attached list but cards have subsequently been prepared at the Bureau. Instances of this nature may also occur in those cases where cancellation of a Security Index card has recently been recommended by you and you have not yet received Bureau authorization to cancel.
3. In checking the Special Section of your Security Index against the attached list you should be certain that the subjects are in the same subdivision as those indicated on the attached list. Appropriate notations should be placed on the attached list if there are any discrepancies between your Special Section and the list.
4. This check must be instituted immediately and completed within 10 days of the receipt of this memorandum by each office. Upon completion, the attached list and appropriate notations should be returned to the Bureau by cover memorandum under instant caption.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MRS. ANNE H. BEECHER

DATE: March 22, 1955

SUBJECT: INTERVIEWS OF SECURITY SUBJECTS
SUGGESTION #129-55

Attached is a suggestion originating with SA Joseph F. Carroll of the New York Office in which he proposes the use of a form in reporting results of interviews with security subjects. The form is also attached. It is stated that the form could be used as a substitute for cover letters in those instances in which a Security Matter - C interview has been authorized and the results of the interview are being forwarded to the Bureau in report form. In other words, the report will set out the results of the interview in detail and under this suggestion the form would be utilized to set out the results in brief with pertinent comment.

The proposed form identifies the report being transmitted; notes the place of interview; identifies the interviewing Agents; indicates whether or not the subject was cooperative; whether he furnished information concerning others, and whether subject will testify concerning others. The form also indicates whether or not the information furnished agrees with known information concerning the subject, whether the subject has informant potentialities, carries a notation as to whether or not authority is being requested to recontact the individual and whether or not an FD-122 (if appropriate) has been submitted.

The SAC in New York recommends against the adoption of the suggestion as follows: "While the suggestion does have advantages from a streamlining standpoint, I think the responses to interviews are varied and we should give the responses to interviews exactly as they appear. I therefore believe that we should continue to submit these letters in narrative form and I do not recommend the suggestion be adopted."

Observations:

The Internal Security Section also opposes adoption of the suggestion. It is felt that the circumstances of our interviews are too varied to commit to a fixed form. In many instances there are circumstances surrounding the interview which must be amplified in advising the Bureau.

Attachments 2

cc - 1
cc - 1
cc - 1
cc - 1
RECORDED - 98
INDEXED - 98

12 APR 1 1955

WGO:mjt
(5) 6:3 AFR 11 1955.

Bus file 109-558036

RECORDED - 98
INDEXED - 98

1895
Series
Prints. files
9-11.

Although cover memoranda do not set out the results of the interviews in detail, they give a concise analysis of the reaction of the individual subject during the course of the interview. In summary, interviews with individuals having different Communist or subversive backgrounds with different dispositions do not lend themselves to standardized reporting as suggested.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the Training and Inspection Division to indicate that the Internal Security Section definitely opposes adoption of Suggestion #129-55.

G
V

JPM
W

1876

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : *[REDACTED]*

DATE: 3/21/55

FROM : *[REDACTED]*

SUBJECT: EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION #129-55

This concerns a proposed form to be executed in connection with certain interviews and the number one advantage is presented as one in the Statistical Section as well as to field supervisors.

We have reviewed this proposed form carefully in the Statistical Section and are unable to determine any area where it fits into our work and accordingly, we cannot endorse it as a streamlining device for the Statistical Section.

Attachment

AEL:fhj
(3)

RECORDED-11

12 APR 1 1955

21103 APR 7 1955 EX-117

FILED
2-1

1376
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

6/12/9-55
Date March 14, 1955

To: Director, FBI Attention: Training and Inspection Division
From: Special Agent _____
Field Office or Division New York

SUGGESTION:


The attached form is being recommended as a substitute for the cover letter presently in use in those instances where an SM-C interview has been authorized and the results of interview are being forwarded to the Bureau in report form.

Its advantages are:

- 1) Will streamline processing by Statistical Section at DCB as well as by field supervisors.
- 2) Will reduce dictation and typing time in field.


It should save at least \$ Unknown annually.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States


(Signature of Suggestor)

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:
While the suggestion does have advantages from a streamlining standpoint, I think the responses to interviews are varied and we should give the responses to interviews exactly as they appear. I therefore believe that we should continue to submit these letters in narrative form and I do not recommend the suggestion be adopted.

1 - 66-7111


(Signature)
SAC
Special Agent in Charge
(Title)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 100-1896

TO : Director, F.B.I.

DATE:

FROM : SAC

SUBJECT:

Enclosed are the original and _____ copies of the
report of SA _____ dated _____ at _____.

Date of Interview:

Place of Interview: Residence Bureau Car Street
 Other (Specify) _____

Interviewing Agents:

Cooperative: Yes No

Furnished Information re others: Yes No

Will testify re others: Yes No

Information furnished in substantial agreement with known
data: Yes No Reasons:

PSI or CS potential: Yes No

Request authority to recontact for PSI or CS purposes: Yes
 No

FD 122 submitted Yes dated _____ No

Remarks:

Encls:

100-354086-1896

ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. ██████████

FROM : R. ██████████

SUBJECT:

SUGGESTION # 129-55

MADE BY SA ██████████
NEW YORK CITY OFFICE

DATE: 3/25/55

PJ

Mr. G. C. Foster
RM 5254

SUGGESTION: That a form letter like the one attached be used as a substitute for the cover letter presently used in sending reports to the Bureau on the results of Security Matter - C interviews authorized by the Bureau.

This suggestion comes within the purview of a Special Agent's duties. Special Agent ██████████'s supervisor is SAC ██████████.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: When the Bureau authorizes a Security Matter - C interview the interview is submitted to the Bureau in report form with a cover letter directing the Bureau's attention to specific data and observations of interest to the Bureau. The cover letter evaluates the report.

ADVANTAGES STATED: Will reduce dictation and typing time in the field. Will streamline processing by field supervisors and Statistical Section at the Seat of Government.

DISADVANTAGES STATED: None.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC ██████████, New York City Office, disapproves, stating that responses to interviews are varied and also should be set out exactly as they are received. SAC ██████████, Washington Field Office, states that he heartily agrees with SAC ██████████ and that the results of these interviews are reported in detail by cover letter to show the reaction of the persons approached. SAC McFarlin, Cincinnati Office, disapproves, stating that a form letter cannot get the message across to the Bureau. SAC ██████████, New Orleans Office, disapproves, stating that no form letter can cover all situations. SAC ██████████, Minneapolis Office, agrees with SAC ██████████. Mr. ██████████, Internal Security Section, disapproves the suggestion, stating that these interviews and the information developed by them are too varied to lend themselves to standardized reporting. Mr. ██████████, Statistical Section, makes no recommendation because he cannot see how the suggestion would have a bearing on work of the Statistical Section.

RECORDED-11

DJD:hcc

Attachment

(3)

12 APR 1955

EX-117

12 APR 1 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN C-6-2

3/25/55

SAVINGS: None stated, although it would appear that there would be unestimated savings in dictation and stenographic transcription. There would be offsetting costs in preparing a new form.

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the suggestion not be adopted. *RH* *7/16/55* *1897*

2. That if the suggestion is adopted, no financial award be given because the suggestion comes within the purview of the suggester's duties. If a financial award is considered it would be based on the table for cash savings and since these would be small, the suggester would be entitled to a minimum award of \$10. Special Agent ██████████ has already been thanked by personal letter for submitting the suggestion.

1687
11129-55
EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

March 14, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: SA [REDACTED], NEW YORK

SUGGESTION:

The attached form is being recommended as a substitute for the cover letter presently in use in those instances where an SM-C interview has been authorized and the results of interview are being forwarded to the Bureau in report form.

ADVANTAGES:

1. Will streamline processing by Statistical Section at SOG as well as by field supervisors.
2. Will reduce dictation and typing time in field.

[REDACTED] /s/, Suggester
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATION OF SUPERVISOR, SAC, OR ASSISTANT DIRECTOR:

While the suggestion does have advantages from a streamlining standpoint, I think the responses to interviews are varied and we should give the responses to interviews exactly as they appear. I therefore believe that we should continue to submit these letters in narrative form and I do not recommend the suggestion be adopted.

[REDACTED] /s/ SAC

APR 18 1955
100-358186-1887
ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

1897

TO : Director, F.B.I.

DATE:

FROM : SAC

SUBJECT:

Enclosed are the original and _____ copies of the report of SA _____ dated _____ at _____.

Date of Interview:

Place of Interview: () Residence () Bureau Car () Street
() Other (Specify)

Interviewing Agents:

Cooperative: () Yes () No

Furnished Information re others: () Yes () No

Will Testify re others: () Yes () No

Information furnished in substantial agreement with known data: () Yes () No Reasons:

PSI or CS potential: () Yes () No

Request authority to recontact for PSI or CS purposes: () Yes
() No

FD 122 submitted () Yes dated _____ () No

Remarks:

Encl:

ENCLOSURE

100-368096-1897

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: March 22, 1955

TO

FROM

SUBJECT: CHINESE ALIENS ON SECURITY INDEX

As of March 22, 1955, there are 35 Chinese aliens on the Security Index.

Concerning these 35 cases a review has been made utilizing the Proposed Criteria for Placing and Retaining Names in the Security Index, these Criteria having been submitted to the Department on 3-9-55. This review consisted of a study of (1) memoranda prepared February 1 and 2, 1955, reviewing soundness of these cases, and (2) reports submitted since 2-1-55.

If the Proposed Criteria are adopted, it appears that the 35 cases will break down as follows:

- (1) Two cases in which there is rather strong justification for retention on Security Index.
- (2) Eleven cases that are less substantial, but it is felt sufficient justification exists for retention on Security Index.
- (3) Twenty-two cases in which sufficient justification does not exist for retention on Security Index.

These cases are identified as follows:

DRAFT COPY FILED #

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information. If the Department approves the revised standards, the twenty-two individuals will be removed from the Security Index.

2

1037

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. ~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 16, 1955

FROM : Mr. ~~SECRET~~SUBJECT: INTERVIEWS OF SUBJECTS OF
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONSSYNOPSIS:

By SAC Letter 55 dated May 17, 1949, and Bureau Bulletin #37 dated July 21, 1949, we initiated a program of interviewing certain subjects of security investigations. We currently interview subjects not included in the Security Index when (1) investigation is inconclusive as to a subject's sympathies or whether the subject is or has been a member of a basic revolutionary organization, (2) when the investigation reflects that a subject, formerly a member of a basic revolutionary organization, discontinued such membership and lost sympathy with the subversive movement, and (3) when the investigation reflects routine activities in a basic revolutionary organization several years ago, no current activity is developed, and no specific information is reported that the subject has discontinued his association and lost sympathy with the subversive group. The purposes of such interviews are (1) to determine a subject's sympathies and whether he constitutes a potential threat to the internal security of the country, (2) to determine if the subject will furnish information concerning his activities and activities of others known to him to have been associated with the subversive movement, and (3) to develop security informants. We interview Security Index subjects who have not been reported engaged in subversive activities since January 1, 1949, and Security Index subjects on whom information developed definitely indicates that their activities no longer warrant their inclusion in the Security Index because of defection.

The application of the proposed new standard for inclusion of subjects in the Security Index, presently being considered by the Department, will not affect the basic instructions with regard to interviews. In applying the proposed standard, however, there will be a group of individual subjects in the Security Index who will not fall within new standards and we may desire to interview them prior to removing them from the Security Index in accordance with the proposed curtailment set out below.

(2) To remove a principal area of criticism, it is recommended that in security cases in which the subjects are not included in the Security Index and no evidence of current activity is developed in interviews be considered only where there exists evidence of former membership in a basic revolutionary organization or activity in a subservient group, cited by the Attorney General, in a leadership capacity unless there are specific reasons clearly defined why an interview in a particular case may be desirable. This will eliminate a large number of interviews in areas where the persons interviewed may protest, namely, merely routine joiners or sympathizers with front groups and persons not known to have been members of basic revolutionary organizations.

1677

||(3) That hereafter the SACs be required to pass on the requests for authority to interview prior to their submission to the Bureau. This will have the effect of tightening up on the requests.

If you approve the above recommendations, an appropriate SAC Letter and Manual changes will be prepared.

JB

R

Agree

3-14

✓

Taylor

DETAILS:

I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERVIEW PROGRAM

We currently interview subjects not included in the Security Index when (1) investigation is inconclusive as to a subject's sympathies or whether the subject is or has been a member of a basic revolutionary organization, (2) when the investigation reflects that, although the subject was formerly a member of or affiliated with a basic revolutionary organization, he subsequently discontinued such membership or affiliation and lost sympathy with the subversive movement, and (3) when the investigation reflects that the subject engaged in routine activities in a basic revolutionary organization several years ago but no current subversive activity is developed even though no specific information is reported that the subject has discontinued his association and lost sympathy with the subversive movement.

The purposes of the interviews of this nature are to determine a subject's sympathies when the investigation is inconclusive or to determine whether a subject continues to adhere to revolutionary doctrine thereby remaining a potential threat to the internal security of the country; to determine whether a subject will furnish information concerning his activities and the activities of others known to him to have been associated with a subversive movement, and to endeavor to develop among such subjects security informants.

We interview Security Index subjects who have not been reported engaged in subversive activities since January 1, 1949, and Security Index subjects on whom information developed definitely indicates that their activities no longer warrant their inclusion in the Security Index because of defection, prior to removing them from the Security Index.

IV. ADEQUACY OF PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS RE INTERVIEWS CONSIDERED IN
THE LIGHT OF PROPOSED NEW SECURITY INDEX STANDARDS

The application of the proposed new standards for the inclusion of subjects in the Security Index, presently being considered by the Department, will not affect the basic instructions with regard to interviews. If the new standards are adopted, there will be a group of individuals presently on the Security Index who will not fall within the new standards and under current instructions we would consider them for interview prior to removing them from the Security Index.

1955

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: April 1, 1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - *1000000*

During the past week 1 card was added to the Security Index and 31 cards were cancelled, a net decrease of 30 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,525.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

1903

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date March 16, 1955

To: DIRECTOR, FBI

From: SA

Field Office or Division SAN FRANCISCO

SUGGESTION: Re SAC LETTER 55-12(A), 2/10/55, regarding the submission of recommendations for retention of Security Index subjects tabbed DETCOM. It is suggested that other offices having a large number of individuals on the SI be advised that the recommendation for retention of DETCOM tabbing be added to the bottom of the FD-122 necessarily submitted to indicate the deletion of COMSAB tabbing. In most cases the reason for DETCOM tabbing is clear and unmistakable and requires only a statement, such as "The subject is a Key Figure," or "Organizer for a (particular) Branch of the CP", etc.

Its advantages are: By adding this statement to the FD-122, the submission of a separate memorandum and the necessary duplication in typing and handling of the files is eliminated. In those cases where the subject is not clearly in one of the enumerated categories in SAC Letter 55-12, separate memoranda will continue to be submitted.

It should save at least \$? annually.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

(Signature of Suggestor)

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:

This suggestion is worthy of consideration and it is believed that at the present time it will save the Bureau considerable paper work, as well as stenographic, clerical and Agent time, if it is handled in this manner. Actually, this method has been utilized in a number of instances already by the San Francisco Office.

FIELD SUPERVISOR

UNCLASSIFIED

STANLEY C. COOK NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: March 17, 1955

FROM :

SUBJECT:

JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN EVENT OF
FORMOSAN OPEN HOSTILITIES

3/17/52

With regard to U.S. citizens of Chinese national origin on the Security Index, we have informed the Attorney General in our proposed letter that these individuals also are receiving our current attention and that our coverage of them likewise will be intensified in the event of such open hostilities.

We are informing the Attorney General that with regard to these Chinese at the UN as well as the non-Chinese on the Security Index who are sympathetic to Communist China, we are presently giving investigative attention to these cases and that our coverage will be intensified in the event of Formosan open hostilities.

The eighth phase of the program mentioned by the Attorney General in his letter concerned the draft of an announcement by the President alerting citizens to dangers of sabotage, etc. We are informing the Attorney General that the draft will be inserted into the portfolio for the Emergency Detention Program as soon as it is received from Assistant Attorney General Rankin of the Department.

3

3/17/

The ninth matter covered by the Attorney General concerns the implementing of the Emergency Detention Program in the event of a surprise attack on Washington, D. C. He are suggesting that the Attorney General issue amended instructions to cover the modification of paragraph 9, Section 3, Part II of the "Instructions for Key Personnel of the Department of Justice in Event of a Civil Defense Emergency," dated 2-7-55. This modification authorized the Director to implement apprehension, search and seizure features of Emergency Detention Program in the event of a surprise attack on Washington, D.C., when a communication of authorization cannot be received from the President, the Attorney General or the first five officials in the chain of authority in the Department of Justice because of the surprise nature of the attack and its possible results.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE: 4/5/55

FROM

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER
MADE BY SA
SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

GenL

SUGGESTION: That in deleting Security Index subjects from COMSAB as required by current Bureau instructions and retaining them on DETCOM, the reason for the retention be added at the bottom of Form FD-122 (copy attached) rather than by separate memorandum in addition to Form FD-122 which must be submitted in all cases.

The suggestion comes within the purview of the suggester's duties. His supervisor is SAC San Francisco.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Each subject tab for DETCOM made up on Form FD-122. Memorandum of justification for this tabbing is also submitted.

ADVANTAGES STATED: Eliminate the separate memorandum and the dictation, typing, filing, et cetera, which it entailed.

DISADVANTAGES STATED: None.

SAVINGS: Unestimated savings from eliminating the preparation and handling of one memorandum on each DETCOM subject.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Cincinnati, SAC Minneapolis, and SAC New Orleans, all recommended against adoption of this suggestion, stating that the program of revising the Security Index to eliminate COMSAB tabbing and retaining important subjects on DETCOM tabbing will soon be completed. Also, the memoranda justifying these tabbings will present a better picture of the action taken and they are short and relatively inexpensive to prepare. Assistant Director advises that the Domestic Intelligence Division has no objection to the procedure suggested by San Francisco but the suggestion should not be adopted because a Security Index review will be initiated in the field in the near future and this review will eliminate any necessity for such a procedure as suggested here.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1405

TO : Mr. _____

DATE: March 30, 1955

FROM : Mr. _____

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX *G. L.*
SUGGESTION NUMBER

The attached suggestion from the San Francisco Office refers to SAC Letter 55-12 regarding new standards for the tabbing of Security Index cards for priority apprehension. It contains the recommendation that reasons for retention of "Detcom" tabbing be added to the bottom of Form FD-122 in those cases where such a form is necessarily submitted to indicate the deletion of "Comsab" tabbing which was discontinued by above-mentioned SAC Letter. San Francisco points out that in most cases the reasons for Detcom tabbing are clear and unmistakable and require only a brief statement.

San Francisco points out that by adding the statement to Form FD-122 the submission of a separate memorandum would be eliminated, thereby saving stenographic, clerical and agent time.

New standards for inclusion of subjects in the Security Index are presently under study and in the immediate future the field will be required to review each Security Index case to determine whether the subject should remain on the Security Index. It is contemplated that the review memoranda will also contain a recommendation with regard to priority tabbing and appropriate instructions regarding this will be issued when the Security Index review is initiated.

While there appears to be no objection to the procedure suggested by San Francisco, the initiation of the Security Index review will eliminate the necessity thereof.

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the above it is suggested that this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division to indicate that the Internal Security Section recommends against the adoption of the above suggestion.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNRECORDED

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM :

DATE:
April 4, 1955

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN EVENT
OF FORMOSAN OPEN HOSTILITIES

UNRECORDED

4/4/55 (ENCL.)

The Director pointed out that 5 of these 76 students are among the 35 Chinese aliens on the Security Index. We will check to be sure that State Department and Defense Department have received information on these 5 individuals.

Be certain this is promptly done. H.

3. (B) CHINESE ON SECURITY INDEX

advised that he and the Internal Security Division of the Department had made a study of the 35 Chinese aliens on the Security Index, on whom warrants have been issued, and he has concluded that the warrants signed by Deputy Attorney General Rogers and presently outstanding are not applicable except as to those individuals presently considered deportable by INS.

said that the Internal Security Division is going over these 35 cases carefully to consider the amount of evidence that is available.

The Director pointed out that the Internal Security Division had gone over the cases before the warrants were drawn up. said that this was done on a "crash" basis and the Department is again going over the cases. The Attorney General stated that the warrants should not be cancelled, pending the review of the cases by the Internal Security Division of the Department, and should an emergency happen tomorrow, we would make the arrests of these 35 persons.

Deputy Attorney General requested the Internal Security Division of the Department to consider any other applicable statutes or methods whereby these 35 subjects could be detained in a limited emergency.

We are reviewing these 35 cases in light of the proposed revised standards, and if you agree we will point out to the Department those who would not be held under the revised standards.

This should be given to the Director. H.

UNRECORDED

4/4/55 (ENCL.)

3. (b) NON-CHINESE ON THE SECURITY INDEX WHO ARE SYMPATHETIC
TO COMMUNIST CHINA
The Director noted the status of these 13 cases, and stated
in the event of hostilities we would intensify our coverage.

4/4/55

UNCLASSIFIED

9. IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW SECURITY INDEX EMERGENCY DETENTION PROGRAM
10. This was discussed in some detail. The Director strongly recommended that revised Security Index standards be adopted, even perhaps stronger than those which the Bureau had suggested, in view of the fact that the Department questions whether the 35 Chinese aliens on the Security Index can be arrested on deportation warrants. The

4/4/55

UNRECORDED

|| Attorney General agreed that the criteria should be strengthened.
|| The Attorney General instructed that and study these
|| criteria promptly and come up with a recommendation.

Press Conference
The Director read the proposed changes in the Security Index
standards, and the Attorney General indicated they sounded logical
to him.

2. We are checking to be sure that we have given the Defense
Department and the State Department information on the 5 individuals
who are on the Security Index, and who are part of the 76 students
to be allowed to depart the country.

UNRECORDED

4/4/55

3. We are checking immediately the cases of the 35 alien Chinese on the Security Index under the new criteria, and will furnish you a memorandum reflecting those who will come off the index and those who will stay on, on a case basis.

We are also checking the 67 Chinese citizens on the Security Index and will give you the figures as to those who will come off and those who will stay on. This memorandum will also reflect whether we furnished reports in the 35 cases to and

1757
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE: April 11, 1955

FROM

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX
Bufile

SYNOPSIS:

By memorandum of April 11, 1955, the Attorney General has indicated his approval of revised Security Index criteria forwarded to the Department by our letter of March 9, 1955. The Attorney General has advised that one minor amendment should be made in the criteria to make the language conform to that set out in the Presidential Proclamation, as contained in the Attorney General's Portfolio which sets out the planning for the Emergency Detention Program. The above amendment involves the substitution in paragraph 1(d) of the phrase "the national defense and public safety of the United States in time of emergency" for the phrase "the security of the country in time of emergency." The criteria have been modified in accordance with the Attorney General's instructions.

With the final approval by the Department of the new criteria, we propose to reinstitute the Security Index review project in the field. Attached is a proposed SAC letter in which we are instructing the field to reinstitute the review immediately and to analyze each Security Index case critically in light of the new criteria which are set out under a separate heading in the proposed SAC letter.

With the review project we are also resuming the screening of the cases for priority apprehension (DETCOM) under the revised Detcom criteria set out in SAC Letter 55-12(A) of February 10, 1955. The analysis regarding Detcom tabbing is geared directly to the review project, with the result that at the completion of the review the Security Index will be in a completely current status.

Enclosure

1957

In view of the scope of the review, involving over 26,000 cases, and the fact that it is a two-fold project involving application of the revised Security Index and Detcom criteria, we have spelled out the mechanics of handling to make absolutely certain that the procedures are thoroughly understood by the field.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the attached proposed SAC letter will be sent to the field to reinstitute the Security Index review project under the revised criteria. If you approve, this SAC letter will be transmitted to the field without delay, separately if necessary, in order that the review may be commenced at the earliest possible moment in the field. Manual changes are being prepared.

OK W

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: April 11, 1955

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT PLANS IN THE EVENT OF FORMOSAN
OPEN HOSTILITIES

The fourth conference dealing with the above subject matter was held in the Attorney General's office at 10:00 a.m., April 11, 1955. In addition to the Attorney General and the Director the following were present:

From Immigration and Naturalization Service:

From Department:

From FBI:

1. Legal Basis for the Revised Criteria
for the Security Index

It was advised that the Legal Counsel's office had gone over the criteria and found that they came within the Presidential Proclamation which would go into effect in the event of an emergency. It was said that item (d) in our proposed revised criteria is not worded exactly the same as the Presidential Proclamation relative to "acts injurious to the security of the country in time of emergency" although to his mind it means the same thing. The Director stated that we had no objection to having the wording changed exactly as set forth in the Presidential Proclamation. The Attorney General instructed

MEMORANDUM FOR

to get up a memorandum this afternoon for the Attorney General's signature approving the revised criteria and incorporating this change in wording. (This change in wording will have no effect on the criteria.)

The Attorney General asked whether would again go over the list of prominent persons which the Department has been reviewing to see whether they should go on the Index. Tompkins said the Internal Security Division would go over the list of those which the Department has not passed on and will furnish the Bureau with memoranda at once. (Relative to those on the Prominent Persons list which the Department has already passed on, we are reviewing these files under the revised criteria and will advise the Department of our findings. However, we will require the Department to specifically comment on each one of these cases as to whether they should or should not be retained on the Index.)

2. Report of the Portfolio

The Attorney General stated that he had signed an order this morning authorizing the Director to go ahead and initiate the Emergency Detention Program in the event it was not possible to reach the first five people in the Departmental chain of command. You will recall that we have been after the Department to bring this instruction up to current status in order that it may be inserted in the Portfolio. Presumably, will furnish us this by memorandum and will arrange to see that it goes into the Portfolio supplanting the outdated instructions. If this is not done promptly, we will follow up.

We have also been following the Department for some time to resolve certain questions with the Department of Defense relative to the temporary retention and custody of Security Index subjects picked up in time of emergency. said that the Defense Department agreement has been received. is to go over this carefully. said that there are still a couple of points of disagreement. He stated he would get a copy of this to the Bureau this afternoon in order that we could look it over.

CONFIDENTIAL

4/11/53

MEMORANDUM FOR

Relative to the proposal that the list of subversive organizations to which aliens may not belong should be drawn up by the Attorney General and agreed to by the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General authorized to contact the Department of Defense to get their agreement to this procedure. [redacted] stated there is a question in the minds of the Internal Security Division as to whether this list of subversive organizations should include all of the organizations listed by the Attorney General under Executive Order 10450. He pointed out that the current list includes Japanese and Italian organizations and many which had gone out of existence. He said the Internal Security Division would like to go over this list to eliminate those which should not be included by the Attorney General for purposes of the Emergency Detention Program. The Attorney General said this was worth exploring and the Internal Security Division is going over this list. This is essentially a Departmental problem and not a problem of the Bureau.

[redacted] raised the question as to whether the Attorney General, in an emergency, should not go direct to the President in order that the President could sign the Proclamation putting into effect the Emergency Detention Program. The Attorney General said this was a question that the President would have to resolve as he would be under instructions from the President. It was pointed out to the Attorney General that whatever was worked out in this respect should be worked out in advance in order that there would be no holding up of the Emergency Detention Program pending a conference between the Attorney General and the President; that conditions could well be such that the Attorney General would not be able to reach the President. The Director pointed out that the Attorney General should have an airplane at his disposal in Quantico in order that he could, if necessary, fly to the President from the relocation site. This must necessarily be worked out through the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) and the Attorney General instructed that Tompkins should do this. As this is essentially a Departmental problem, we will not contact ODM on this, as the Attorney General instructed Tompkins to do so.

4/11/55

UNRECORDED

MEMORANDUM FOR

ACTION:

(1) We are reviewing the cases of the Prominent Individuals whom the Department has already approved for the Security Index under the old standards. We will submit our findings by individual memorandum to the Department with the request that the Department advise in each case whether the subject should or should not be included on the Index.

(2) As soon as the Attorney General's memorandum is received approving the revised criteria, an SAC Letter will be sent at once to the field instructing that these criteria be applied to the Security Index and that the review of the Security Index cases be reinstated. We will set the same deadlines as we had on the previous review, namely, 60 days for all offices having less than 1,000 subjects; 90 days for those over 1,000, except New York which will be given 6 months. We will stress that the reviews should be completed prior to these deadlines, if possible. However, as the field will have to again go over all Security Index cases, based on the new criteria, it is believed that we will have to give them this much time.

(3) We will go over the revised agreement between the Defense Department and the Attorney General to make sure that it meets our requirements as soon as the Department sends it to us.

4/11/55
AG's
memo
need
SAC
Letter
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UNRECORDED

4/11/55

(5) Liaison is contacting , of I&NS, to get
the exact status of the 35 Chinese aliens, and a memorandum
will be submitted.

3/16/55
ENCL. TO APR. 4/55

UNRECORDED

**STANDARDS USED FOR INCLUDING NAMES
IN THE SECURITY INDEX**

On the following pages are listed the old standards used in determining whether a subject's name should be included in the Security Index. The net effect of the revised standards is to place a cut-off date prior to which the subversive activities of an individual will not qualify him for the Security Index unless those activities are of such a pronounced nature as to clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the security of the country in time of an emergency.

In addition, the revised standards in effect require evidence which would cause a hearing board to hold a subject whereas some of the old standards resolved a case in favor of security.

3/16/55
ENCL. TO APR. 4/55

STANDARDS FOR INCLUSION IN THE SECURITY INDEX

Individuals who, through investigation, have been disclosed as falling in certain categories can be classed as definitely dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country and should be included in the Security Index. As indicated above, it is not possible to categorize all subjects of security investigations because of their varying degrees of subversive activity and revolutionary dispositions. Therefore, the following standards must not be relied upon as all-inclusive but must be used as a guide in assisting you in determining whether a subject should be recommended for inclusion in the Security Index.

Any individual who comes within one or more of the following categories shall be considered for inclusion in the Security Index.

- (A) Any individual known to be currently engaged in espionage activities.
- (B) Any individual who has knowledge of or who has given or received instructions or assignment in espionage, counter-espionage or sabotage services or procedures of a government or political party of a foreign country -- except where such activity was obtained for lawful purposes on behalf of the United States Government or where such activity has been offset by subsequent cooperation with the United States Government.
- (C) Any individual who has participated in the past in any act of espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any act of espionage, counterespionage or sabotage for a foreign power or foreign political party against the interests of the United States -- except where such activity has been offset by subsequent cooperation with the Government of the United States.
- (D) Any individual who has been active at any time in the espionage, counterespionage, sabotage service or procedures of any basic revolutionary organization or World Communist Movement -- except where such activity has been offset by subsequent cooperation with the Government of the United States.

EXCL/CS/SL

3/16/55
ENCL. TO APR. 4/55

(E) Membership in basic revolutionary organization --

- (I) Any individual who is known to have been a member of one of the basic revolutionary organizations after January 1, 1949, and who is not known to have defected therefrom or his activities have not been offset by cooperation with the United States Government.
- (II) Any individual who is known to have been a member of a basic revolutionary organization prior to January 1, 1949, who is not known to have defected therefrom or his activities have not been offset by cooperation with the United States Government and:
 - (A) Has had years of training and experience in the organization.
 - (B) Has been responsible for actual execution of the organization's orders.
 - (C) Has received special training in the organization or has had training in the Lenin School or Far Eastern Institute in Moscow.
 - (D) Has occupied one or more positions of leadership in the organization.
 - (E) Has at any time been involved in the Red Army Intelligence, the MVD, or MGB, or intelligence service of any foreign country.
 - (F) Has been used as a courier or mail drop by the revolutionary organization.
 - (G) Has served in the armed forces of any country.
 - (H) Served in the Loyalist forces in Spain during the Spanish Civil War.
 - (I) Served with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II.
 - (J) Is employed by a municipal or state government or the Federal Government.

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ENCL. 4
APP 4 755

(K) Is employed in or connected with any industry or facility vital to the national defense, health or welfare.

(L) Is employed in any position having potentialities for espionage or sabotage.

(M) Who has access to explosives, chemicals, weapons, ammunition or other material or equipment which could logically be utilized by revolutionary groups in an armed uprising.

(N) Has had experience as a picket captain, strong-arm man or has otherwise actively participated in violent strikes, riots or demonstrations.

(O) Is employed as an organizer or official of a labor union.

(P) Has held positions which determined the destiny of front or mass organizations.

(F) Membership in front organizations only
Any individual who is not known to have held membership in one of the basic revolutionary organizations but who has continued to adhere to the policies and doctrines of revolutionary groups subsequent to the outbreak of Korean hostilities (June 25, 1950) by continuing activity in the affairs of one or more front organizations in a leadership capacity or by active participation in the furtherance of the aims and purposes of the front organization.

(G) Espousing the line
Any individual who has not been determined to have been a member of or associated with either a basic revolutionary organization or front organization but who has continued to adhere to the policies and doctrines of revolutionary groups since the outbreak of Korean hostilities (June 25, 1950) by espousing the line of such organizations.


3/10/55

ENCL. TO APR. 4/55

(II) Independent adherence to revolutionary ideology

Any individual who has not been determined to have at any time been a member of or to have associated with any basic revolutionary or front organization but has by statement or action declared his continued adherence to and support of the revolutionary ideology of a foreign government or foreign political party as opposed to the best interests of the United States Government, or any individual who, because of anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety and welfare.

UNRECORDED



SAC LETTER NO. 55-30
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

April 12, 1955 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RE: SECURITY INDEX

A. Review Project

As I pointed out in SAC Letter 55-8 of February 2, 1955, the Attorney General has advised me that he does not have the funds or manpower to review the Security Index cases. This means, of course, that the responsibility for the soundness of these cases rests entirely upon the FBI, placing us in the undesirable position of being both the investigator and prosecutor with respect to these subjects, most of whom are United States citizens. We must take every means at our disposal to insure that these cases are completely sound and that it is established beyond question that the subjects are potentially dangerous.

The general review of all Security Index cases in the field is being reinstated, effective at once. This is not a continuation of the review initiated by the above SAC Letter. It is a complete restudy of each and every Security Index case in the light of newly-adopted criteria, set forth hereinafter. Be guided by these instructions:

1. Analyze thoroughly each Security Index case in your office in light of the new criteria, below.
2. Following analysis of each case, send a memorandum to the Bureau containing the following items and utilizing the following headings:
 - (a.) Under the heading "Reference," refer ^{to APR 10 1955} to this communication.
 - (b.) Under the heading "Succinct Resume of Case," set out a clear concise picture of subject's activities. You must not attempt to incorporate by reference any data set out in a previous memorandum submitted in response to SAC Letter 55-8, above. The memoranda required herein must be entirely complete in themselves. I will not tolerate general statements or mere conclusions regarding the facts in these cases.
 - (c.) Under the heading "Recommendation," set out your recommendation in each case to either "Retain in Security Index" or "Remove from Security Index." Each recommendation must state specifically the basis for retaining subject in or removing subject from the Security Index. The specific activities bringing the subject within the revised

4/12/55

criteria and the fact that the information comes from reliable informants or sources must be shown.

(d.) Under the heading "Detcom Tabbing," set out these data:

- (1) Present tabbing of subject.
- (2) Whether or not subject has been approved for Detcom tabbing under the new criteria in SAC Letter 55-12 (A) of February 10, 1955, noting specifically whether or not Security Index cards have been received from the Bureau bearing the stamp "DETCOM" in large red letters.
- (3) If not previously approved under the new criteria, set out your recommendation as to Detcom tabbing together with the specific basis for such recommendation.

Follow the procedure outlined in SAC Letter 55-12 (A), above, with regard to removal of Detcom and/or Comsab tabbings and designations for Detcom under the new standards.

3. Each SAC is being held personally responsible for each recommendation submitted. Each SAC must personally approve the recommendation submitted by his office with regard to Security Index status of each subject, excepting the larger offices under the conditions noted specifically in SAC Letter 55-8, above.

4. Submit an airtel captioned "Security Index Review" each Friday, beginning April 22, 1955, setting out (1) total number of cases to be reviewed, (2) number of cases in which data required herein have been forwarded to Bureau and (3) of the latter number, how many contain recommendations to remove subjects from the Security Index.

5. The reviews must be completed within 60 days from receipt of this communication by all offices with less than 1000 Security Index cases and within 90 days by the remaining offices excepting New York, which must complete the project within six months. All offices must start the review immediately.

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UNREFINED

4/12/55

6. I want you to discuss this matter fully with both Agent and Supervisory personnel and point out to them the vital necessity of studying the Security Index cases critically and objectively. Application of the new criteria to your cases will undoubtedly result in substantial reduction in the Security Index throughout the field.

7. Under the Security Index review project, each case must be analyzed as it stands. Do not request authority to interview or any other action of the Bureau in the memoranda submitted in the review project. Interviews already authorized should be conducted and the results considered under the review project, but they must not delay submission of recommendations regarding Security Index status by the deadline date.

B. Security Index Criteria

Effective at once, the addition to and retention of names in the Security Index shall be governed by the following criteria:

1. No name shall be added to or retained in the Security Index unless one or more of the following situations has been established through investigation:

(a.) Subject has had membership or participation in the activities of a basic revolutionary organization within the last 5 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(b.) Subject has had membership or participation in the affairs of one or more front organizations, which adhere to the policies and doctrines of a revolutionary group, in a leadership capacity or by active substantial participation in the furtherance of the aims or purposes of the front organization within the last 3 years as shown by overt acts or statements established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(c.) Investigation has developed information that an individual, though not a member or a participant in the activities of a subversive organization, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon

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SAC LETTER NO. 55-30

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4/12/55

the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants, or individuals.

(d.) Although investigation has failed to establish overt acts or statements on the part of a subject within the time limits set out above, facts have been developed which clearly and unmistakably depict the subject as a dangerous individual who could be expected to commit acts inimical to the national defense and public safety of the United States in time of emergency.

2. In evaluating interviews insofar as Security Index status is concerned you should be guided as follows:

(a.) Whenever a subject of a security investigation by a positive statement to interviewing Agents clearly indicates a continued adherence to the doctrines, aims or purposes of a revolutionary organization or a front organization, the positive statement shall be considered an overt act on the part of the subject in establishing continued adherence.

(b.) Other than as indicated above, interviews with Security Index subjects or potential Security Index subjects are not to be considered as factors requiring the placing or retaining of names of persons on the Security Index; for example, lack of cooperation or partial cooperation are not to be regarded as such factors.

With regard to the new criteria, I want to make it exceedingly clear that item 1, (d), above, must be given strict interpretation. It is not to be construed as a "catchall" for cases not otherwise meeting Security Index standards, and there must be overwhelming evidence to support any Security Index case predicated upon the terms of item 1. (d). Further, during the Security Index review and on a continuing basis thereafter any recommendation for retention in or addition to the Security Index based upon item 1. (d) must note specifically those factors which bring the individual cases within its provisions.

4/12/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-30

Very truly yours,
John Edgar Hoover

Director

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 4/13/55

FROM : Executives Conference

SUBJECT: REVIEW OF CASE FILES ON
SECURITY INDEX SUBJECTS DURING INSPECTIONS ✓

On 4/13/55 the Conference, composed of Messrs. Tolson, Nichols, Boardman, Tamm, Parsons, Sizoo, Hennrich, Finterrowd, Holloman and Harbo, considered whether any change should be made in existing policies with reference to the review of case files on Security Index subjects during field office inspections. The existing rule provides that all pending case files shall be reviewed and that a spot check will be made of the closed files.

The Conference was unanimously of the opinion that the present procedure should be continued with the exception that in the current inspection of the New York Office no case files on Security Index subjects will be reviewed due to the fact that the field is presently under instructions to review all Security Index case files and submit a memorandum recommending retention on or removal from the list. It was estimated that 2500 to 3000 Security Index case files in New York are in pending status and the review of these by the Inspection Staff would be an unnecessary duplication of what the field office will be doing in the immediate future.

1967

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 4/15/55

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 9 cards were added to
the Security Index and 133 cards were cancelled, a
net decrease of 124 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is
26,320.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

Butfile

1913

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 8, 1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - ~~1913~~
Bufile

The following is a report on the status of the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on March 11, 1955.

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Change</u>
March 12-18	11	7	+ 4
March 19-25	16	90	- 74
March 26-April 1	1	31	- 30
April 2-8	10	91	- 81
	38	219	- 181

During the above-mentioned period there was a net decrease in the Security Index of 181 cards.

For your information, during the preceding four-week period 83 cards were added and 162 cards were cancelled, a net decrease of 79 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,444.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

Pls. sign the lead line
for finishing review of
Security Index under

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION

Date: April 13, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: SA Division of Assignment: WFO

SUGGESTION: That the SI card maintained in each field division show the make, model, type and year and current license tag of the automobile used by or registered to the SI subject.

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts):
SI cards require that subject's photograph, physical description, current address and employment be listed on the card to assist in the apprehension or surveillance of subject.

Advantages of suggestion:

See attached page.

Disadvantages of suggestion: None

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

*Act 4/14/55 - See referred to
Domestic Surveillance Division
for review 4/15/55 - RCU*

Mr.
 Mrs.
 Miss

(Signature of Suggestor)

Recommendations and comments of Division Head:

2 (See recommendation and comments on next page)

Of equal importance in accomplishing the same purpose is knowing the license number of the automobile that the subject uses. It should be kept in mind that if subject is to be apprehended or surveilled there is a good possibility that the Agent assigned to the case will have had no previous opportunity to personally observe subject and must rely upon the information as it appears on the SI card. Identifications from photographs and physical descriptions are sometimes difficult, particularly where the photograph is old or of poor quality. When an individual resembling subject generally is seen to leave subject's home or place of employment and enter an automobile registered to subject, this fact is of great assistance to the Agent in making his determination as to whether this individual is identical with the subject. If subject's car is noted at his residence in late evening this would be some indication that he might be at home.

If this recommendation is approved, it is recommended that Form FD-154 be amended (per enclosure) to indicate the make, year, model and license number of the automobile used by or registered to the subject. This information can be checked semi-annually once when new license tags are issued, and again when subject's employment and residence are verified.

It is further suggested that if approved, this information be placed on the geographical SI card. It is not contemplated that a special project be instituted to obtain this information, but that it be obtained upon the next six months verification of subject's residence and employment on Form FD-154.

Recommendations and comments of Division Head:

This suggestion appears to have considerable merit, in that information concerning the identification of the particular subject's automobile would be helpful in assisting the apprehending agent. This would be particularly true if the subject was not located at his residence at the time of the apprehension. It appears, however, that the amount of time and investigation required to learn the information initially and to keep it current, such as the purchase of new car, change of license plates, etc., greatly outweighs its usefulness. It is recommended it not be adopted.

VERIFICATION OF INFORMATION ON SECURITY INDEX CARD

MEMORANDUM

Re: This Office File

The following is the most recent place of employment, employment address, residence address and descriptive information of automobile used by above subject as contained on the subject's security index card.

Employment:

Address:

Residence:

Automobile Registered to or used by subject (Include type, make, model, year and current license number)

Remarks:

It is requested that the place of employment, address of employment, the residence address of the subject and information regarding subject's automobile be verified and the proper notation be made below:

Employment:

Address:

Verified By:

Method of Verification:

Date:

Residence:

Verified By:

Method of Verification:

Date:

Automobile used by or registered to subject:

Verified By:

Method of Verification:

The security index card on this subject should be revised if any changes are noted above.

1912

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: April 14, 1955

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

SAC Letter 55-30 of 4-12-55 forwarded revised Security Index criteria to the field and reinstated the Security Index review project.

The revised criteria are more stringent than those previously in effect, introducing specific time limits insofar as overt subversive acts are concerned. The application of the revised criteria will undoubtedly result in the removal of great numbers of subjects from the Security Index. In many cases the subjects will be removed from the Security Index even though there is no indication of defection on their part, if, for example, there are no overt acts within the prescribed limits. The possibility exists, of course, that some of the persons in this category are "sleepers," who have deliberately withdrawn from subversive activities. They remain potential threats and in case of an all-out emergency, their identities should be readily accessible to permit restudy of their cases.

It has been suggested that procedure be devised whereby the field may keep track of these subjects. Two possible methods may be considered: (1) By permitting the field to retain under appropriate security the cancelled Security Index cards of these subjects removed purely on the basis of application of the new criteria or (2) forwarding to the field the respective Security Index lists for each office as of March 15, 1955 (such a list is available), allowing for recourse at any time in the future to the list for reference purposes.

OBSERVATIONS:

I feel that the procedure of retaining the cancelled cards in the field is preferable. It would permit ready recourse to these cards in the event of an extreme emergency. It should be borne in mind that such procedure would be two-fold in providing for maintenance in one place of (1) the cards cancelled during the Security Index review and (2) the cards cancelled on a continuing basis when the field examines these cases in connection with periodic reports. In the latter instances, cancellations will be made when the time limits are observed to have expired.

Enclosure 1613

As noted above, a Security Index list, by office, could be furnished the field. For reasons of security it would require filing, rendering it more inaccessible. Further, the list would include cases removed from the Security Index because of death, permanent departure from the country, or development as sources or informants. Use of the list for future reference would involve screening out such cases. Cancelled cards of subjects in these categories would be destroyed.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, there is attached a proposed SAC Letter instructing the field to retain the cancelled cards of those former Security Index subjects who have given no actual indication of defection, in line with the foregoing. Manual changes are being prepared.

EXECUTIVES' CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION: April 18, 1955

The Executives' Conference, consisting of Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted], on April 18, 1955, unanimously recommended approval of the attached SAC Letter.

UNRECORDED

4/12/55

APR 12 1955

(I) COMMUNIST PARTY, USA - UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS - INTERNAL SECURITY - C -- Volume of mail sent to New York City Office under above caption increased considerably in recent months. Analysis shows many offices ask New York to investigate missing Security Index subjects without logical reason to believe these subjects are in New York area. Discontinue illogical requests of New York; carefully analyze and prepare all others.

To reduce administrative complexity for investigations of National apparatus of Communist underground, instructions in SAC Letter 16, February 13, 1951, that New York be given pertinent background information on missing subjects are rescinded.

Bureau reiterates instructions that mail with caption relate specifically to that topic; do not use as a "catchall." Take appropriate measures to comply; Bureau following closely.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Attachments for (E) & (H)

4/12/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-29

- 4 -

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 4/19/55

TO : Director, FBI
FROM : SAC, San Juan
SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

Re SAC Letters 55-8 dated February 2, 1955, and 55-12 dated February 10, 1955.

FD-122's recommending deletion of Comsab tabbing of Security Index subjects have been submitted on all such subjects in the San Juan Division.